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Third Party Stepparent Childcare

by Jeffrey A. Parness
I.

INTRODUCTION

More and more children are raised by a parent and a stepparent.'
These children are often unaware of the differences between such child
caretakers under law. When a parent and a stepparent separate,
stepparent childcare often ceases at the direction of the parent,
sometimes prompting harm to the child, to the stepparent, and to other
one-time and current family members (including stepgrandparents and
stepsiblings). As well, stepparent childcare can cease when a parent
dies, prompting similar harm.2
Court orders on continuing stepparent childcare, over parental
objections, upon parent and stepparent separations or parental deaths
are sometimes available.' Stepparents can be deemed legal parents (as
under de facto parentage and equitable adoption doctrines).' Stepparents can also be afforded third party (that is nonparent) standing to seek

* Professor Emeritus, Northern Illinois University College of Law. Colby College (B.A.,

1970); The University of Chicago Law School (J.D., 1974). Member, State Bar of Illinois.
Thanks to my research assistants, Kelvin Kakazu, Amanda Beveroth, Oran Cart, and
Danny Mark. All errors are mine.
1. See, e.g., ROSE M. KREIDER & DAPHNE A. LOFQUIST, ADOPTED CHILDREN AND
STEPCHILDREN: 2010, at 21-22 (2014), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2014pubs/-

p20-572.pdf ("To put it another way, 11 percent of children living with one biological or
adoptive parent who was cohabiting (but not with the child's other biological or adoptive
parent) lived with their parent's cohabiting partner who was identified as the child's
stepparent. Of the estimated 4.3 million children who lived with at least one stepparent,
88 percent lived with married parents, 64 percent with their biological mother and
stepfather, and 19 percent with their biological father and stepmother. Twelve percent of
children who lived with at least one stepparent lived with unmarried parents, 76 percent
of whom lived with two unmarried parents.").
2. Id. at 21.
3. In re Custody of B.M.H., 315 P.3d 470, 478 (Wash. 2013).
4. Id. at 479.
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childcare orders.' Availability of continuing stepparent childcare is
limited, however, by the superior parental rights doctrine arising under
the federal constitution, which is most notably addressed in 'Roxel v.
Granville.6 Without federal constitutional constraints, third party
stepparent childcare orders are further limited by incomplete, stingy, or
absent state legislation. Too often, statutory barriers significantly
disserve the best interests of children, particularly by prompting
terminations of loving and beneficial stepchild-stepparent (and related
familial) relationships without serving meaningful, countervailing
interests. Courts commonly refrain from lawmaking in the absence of
General Assembly directive.
This Article explores the federal constitutional limits on third party
stepparent childcare over current parental objections. The Article then
surveys both general and special contemporary American state laws on
third party childcare, as well as some recent Illinois General Assembly
proposals since they further illustrate available options for American
state lawmakers. This Article finds existing legislative initiatives
lacking, resulting in inadequate protections of the best interests of
children, which is the guiding principle for most all of American state
laws on child welfare.
The Article concludes by urging broader
opportunities for stepparent' third party childcare,' with expansion

5. Id.
6. 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (plurality opinion).
7. Herein, a stepparent usually refers to one in, or formerly in, a state-recognized
relationship (for example, marriage, civil union, or domestic partnership) with a parent of
a child born or adopted before the relationship began and with whom the stepparent has
no genetic ties. It, thus, excludes some present or earlier cohabitants with parents. A
stepparent includes one in a state-recognized relationship with a parent at the time a child
is born, whose presumed parentage (due to presumed genetic ties) has been disestablished
but who continues to live with the parent and child. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Purcell,
825 N.E.2d 724 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). Present and former stepparents are not always
comparably treated under the law. See, e.g., In re Adoption of L.M., 288 P.3d 864, 869
(Kan. Ct. App. 2012) (former stepparent could not adopt child via "second-parent adoption"
afforded a current stepparent; court is reluctant to allow adoption where statutory
language is "clear and unambiguous"). Stepparent sometimes includes, as in census
surveys, those who cohabit with children and their biological or adoptive parents to whom
they were never in a state-recognized relationship. See KREIDER & LOFQUIST, supra note
1.
8. Childcare herein includes child custody, child visitation, parenting time, and
comparable child placement directives by courts. The paper explores stepparent childcare
for children regardless of whether the child was born of sex or not. In many states,
including Illinois, for children born of assisted reproduction, there are both general
statutory provisions, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/1 to 40/3 (West 2009), and statutory
provisions that govern surrogacy agreements specifically, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/1
to 47/75 (West 2009). Only for children born of sex has the U.S. Supreme Court recognized
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coming preferably via new special stepparent childcare statutes, rather
than by general third party childcare laws or by common law precedents.9
II.

FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON THIRD PARTY
STEPPARENT CHILDCARE

In TRoxel v. Granville,"o Justice O'Connor, writing for herself and
three other United States Supreme Court Justices, noted the "liberty
interests" of parents in the "care, custody, and control of their children"
(herein childcare interests) generally foreclose states from compelling
grandparent visitation over parental objections." Yet, the four Justices
recognized that "special factors" might justify judicial interference as
long as a parent's contrary wishes were accorded "at least some special
weight."l2 The plurality, together with concurring Justice Souter,
reserved the question of whether any "nonparental" visitation order must
"include a showing of harm or potential harm to the child." 3 Justice
Souter did hint, however, that at least some nonparental visitation could
be based solely on a preexisting "substantial relationship" between a

an automatic parental status or childrearing rights for most childbearing mothers and a
paternity opportunity interest in most copulating fathers (where adulterous men may, in
an American state's discretion, not have such interests should the mothers and their
husbands wish to childcare together). See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130
(1989); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983). This examination encompasses children
born of sex to persons in a marriage or civil union, as well as to cohabitating couples and
other single people.
9. The Article does not consider possible federal or state constitutional third party
childcare interests, whether those interests are based on rights afforded to stepparents or
stepchildren, or otherwise grounded.
10. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
11. Id. at 65-66 ("[P]erhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized
by this Court."); see also id. at 68-69 ("[Slo long as a parent adequately cares for his or her
children (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the
private realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent to make the best
decisions concerning the rearing of that parent's children.") (Justice O'Connor, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Ginsburg and Breyer). These liberty interests had
earlier commanded a majority support on the U.S. Supreme Court. See, e.g., Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
12. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 70. One "special weight" case is In re H.A., No. 25832, 2013
Ohio App. LEXIS 5699 (Dec. 13, 2013) (rejecting mother's objections to maternal
grandmother's visitation as objections only founded on mother's soured relationship with
her own mother).
13. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73; see also id. at 77 (Souter, J., concurring) ("[Tihere is no need
to decide whether harm is required.").
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child and a nonparent and on "the State's particular best-interests
standard.""'
In his dissent, Justice Kennedy, not unlike Justice Souter, observed
that a best interests standard might be constitutional where the
nonparent acted "in a caregiving role over a significant period of
time."" His analysis went beyond visitation by hinting such a
nonparent might even be afforded a "de facto" parent status.'a In a
second dissent, Justice Scalia noted the possibility of "gradations" of
nonparents in childcare settings." In a third dissent, Justice Stevens
observed that nonparents seeking childcare must be distinguished by
whether there is a "presence or absence of some embodiment of
family."'
So, parental objections to nonparental childcare are not always
dispositive. Yet, because the U.S. Supreme Court has said little since
roxel, there is much uncertainty.' 9 While some state legislatures
extensively refined their grandparent visitation statutes after Roxel,20

14. Id. at 76-78 (Souter, J., concurring).
15. Id. at 98 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
.16. Id. at 100-01 ("[A] fit parent's right vis-a-vis a complete stranger is one thing; her
ight vis-a-vis another parent or a de facto parent may be another.").
17. Id. at 92-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 88 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
19. One distinguished commentator described Troxel this way:
Troxel did more to confuse than clarify the law in the area of grandparents' rights
laws. On the one hand, the case can be read broadly as reaffirming that parents
have a fundamental right to control the upbringing of their children and as
providing a basis for invalidating orders for grandparent visitation over the
objection of fit parents. On the other hand, Troxel can be read as a very narrow
decision that involved a particularly broad law applied in a situation where the
parent was fit and regular grandparent visitation still occurred. The absence of
a majority opinion makes it even more difficult to assess the impact of the decision
other than the certainty that it will lead to challenges to grandparents' rights laws
throughout the country.
ERwIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 833 (4th ed. 2011).
20. Grandparent visitation statutes are listed in Robyn L. Ginsberg, Grandparents'
Visitation Rights: The Constitutionalityof New York's Domestic Relations Law Section 72
After Troxel v. Granville, 65 ALB. L. REV. 205, 205 n.2 (2001), while the post-Troxel state
cases on the constitutionality of such statutes are reviewed in Sonya C. Garza, The Troxel
Aftermath: A Proposed Solution for State Courts and Legislatures, 69 LA. L. REV. 927
(2009). It should be noted that some grandparent childcare statutes may only apply to
certain, and thus not all, grandparents. Compare MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.27b(5)
(West 2002) (grandparenting time sought by one whose child, the parent, is deceased or has
had parental rights terminated), and Porter v. Hill, 836 N.W.2d 247 (Mich. App. 2013)
(urging for a statutory amendment so that termination of parental rights did not arise
based on abuse or neglect of the children), with In re Dayton R., No. W2014-01904-COA-R3JV, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 229 (Apr. 21, 2015) (grandparent visitation statute applies to
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many have not addressed the third party childcare interests of stepparents.21 Without any, or with stingy or incomplete, statutes, judges are
left to resolve the import of "a caregiving role over a significant period
of time" by a stepparent, assuming there are no statutory or separation
of powers barriers to judicial action.22
Surely, some state legislatures and courts, since Thoxel, have gone
beyond third party childcare by recognizing new parental child
caretaking interests in nonbiological and nonadoptive caretakers,
including grandparents and stepparents.23 Here, one-time third parties
are deemed legal parents sometime after birth through new doctrines
such as equitable estoppel, equitable adoption, and de facto parentage.2" This Article does not explore such parentage, however, because
stepparent childcare remains important nothwithstanding these new
parentage forms, which are typically imprecise because they arise at no
particular moment in time. New parentage is usually foreclosed when
a child already has two other parents who are recognized by the law.25

Further, terminations of parental rights are not only difficult to justify
and prove, but also can end parental child support obligations in ways
sometimes contrary to children's best interests.
III.

SURVEY OF AMERICAN STATE LAWS ON THIRD PARTY
STEPPARENT CHILDCARE

General Laws
American state laws recognize certain parental acts, not amounting to
abuse, neglect, or abandonment, can diminish superior parental rights

A.

great-grandparents).
21. See, e.g., Solangel Maldonado, When Father(or Mother) Doesn't Know Best: QuasiParentsand ParentalDeference After Troxel v. Granville, 88 IOwA L. REv. 865 (2003).
22. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 98 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
23. Ginsberg, supra note 20.
24. See, e.g., In re Custody ofB.M.H., 315 P.3d at 478 (common law de facto parentage
claim was available to the former stepparent where the child had only one existing fit
parent since the biological father died during the pregnancy; court noted that a similar
claim was made available in an earlier case to a former same-sex female partner of the
birth mother).
25. See, e.g., Wyoming ex rel. NDB v. EKB, 35 P.3d 1224, 1228-29 (Wyo. 2001) (when
there is a mother and two presumed fathers, courts must choose between the two fathers
to establish a second parent). One lower court opined judicial recognition of a third parent
is constitutionally foreclosed due to the superior parental rights of the two existing parents.
Bancroft v. Jameson, 19 A.3d 730, 741 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2010). But see CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 7612(c) (West Supp. 2014) (three parents may be designated where "recognizing only two
parents would be detrimental to the child").
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by prompting nonparent childcare standing for stepparents and
others.2 6 Often, the nonparents are described as taking on parental
duties. These laws are frequently comparable to American state laws
recognizing de facto parentage for stepparents and other one-time third
parties.27
For example, a South Dakota statute allows "any person other than
the parent of a child to intervene or petition a court . .. for custody or
visitation of any child with whom he or she has served as a primary
caretaker, has closely bonded as a parental figure, or has otherwise
formed a significant and substantial relationship."2 8 In South Dakota,
a parent's "presumptive right to custody" is diminished when there is
abandonment or persistent neglect; forfeiture or surrender of parental
rights to a nonparent; abdication of "parental rights and responsibilities"; or "extraordinary circumstances" where parental custody "would
result in serious detriment to the child."2 9 In Kentucky, a "de facto
custodian" of a child can seek custody if they were "the primary
caregiver" and "financial supporter," resided with the child for at least
six months, and the child is under three years of age."o In Colorado,

26. The laws (and a proposed model act) on third party childcare are reviewed
exhaustively in Jeff Atkinson, Shifts in the Law Regarding the Rights of Third Partiesto

Seek Visitation and Custody of Children, 47 FAM. L.Q. 1 (2013).
27. At times, the absence of statutory stepparent third party childcare standing can
lead a court to employ a de facto parentage approach to a former stepparent seeking
nonparental custody. In re Custody of B.M.H., 315 P.3d at 447 (prerequisites for a
nonparental custody action were not met).
28. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-5-29 (Supp. 2003). Thus, not all de facto parents can
qualify as de facto custodians with standing to seek childcare orders. See, e.g., Truman v.
Lillard, 404 S.W.3d 863 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012) (former same-sex partner of a woman who
adopted her niece was not a de facto custodian and failed to show a waiver of superior
parental right to custody).
29. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-5-29(1) to (4). The statute was applied to permit
visitation, favoring a man with no biological or adoptive ties. Clough v. Nez, 759 N.W.2d
297 (S.D. 2008); see also S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-5-33 (Supp. 2003) (parent can be ordered
to pay child support to a nonparent with "custodial rights").
30. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270 (West 2006) (requiring residence with the child for
at least one year if the child is older than three years of age). Thus, not all de facto
parents can qualify as de facto custodians with standing to seek childcare. See, e.g.,
Truman, 404 S.W.3d at 869-70 (holding that the former same-sex partner of a woman who
adopted her niece was not a de facto custodian and failed to show a waiver of superior
parental right to custody); Spreacker v. Vaughn, 397 S.W.3d 419, 420 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012)
(affirming the paternal great aunt was a de facto custodian). There are similar laws in
Indiana, K.S. v. B.W., 954 N.E.2d 1050,1051-52 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (employing IND. CODE
ANN. § 31-9-2-35.5 (West 2007)), and Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. 257C.03(6)(a)(2) (West
2007) ("de facto custodian"). The phrase "de facto custodian," and similar phrases, can also
be used in other settings. See, e.g., In re Jesse C., No. C069325, 2012 Cal. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 8512, at *2, *7 (Nov. 26, 2012) (stating de facto parent is one who cares for a child
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there is nonparent standing to seek an allocation of parental responsibilities when the nonparent "has had the physical care of a child for a
period of six months or more."" In New Mexico, when "neither parent
is able . . . to provide appropriate care," a child may be "raised by ...
kinship caregivers, 3 2 who include an adult with a significant bond to
the child and who cares for the child "consistent with the duties and
In Wisconsin, a "person who has
responsibilities of a parent.""
maintained a relationship similar to a parent-child relationship with the
child" may secure "reasonable visitation rights . . . if the court determines that visitation is in the best interest of the child."34 In Missouri,
quite broadly, there is potential "[third-party custody or visitation"
when "the welfare of the child requires, and it is in the best interests of
the child . . . .""
At times, general third party childcare laws apply only in certain
circumstances. One such circumstance is a parent's death or disability.
Thus, a deceased parent's family members will be accorded third party
childcare standing so that, with court approval, a parentless child can
continue significant and beneficial familial relationships."
Besides statutes, there are case precedents generally recognizing
standing for nonparent childcare. For example, in Ohio there can be no
"shared parenting" contracts between parents and nonparents.
However, "a parent may voluntarily share with a nonparent the care,
custody, and control of his or her child through a valid shared-custody
agreement." This may create for a nonparent "an agreement for
permanent shared legal custody of the parent's child" or an agreement

during a dependency proceeding; de facto parent status is lost when dependency is
terminated).
31. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-123(1)(c) (West 2006); see, e.g., In re B.B.O., 277
P.3d 818, 819 (Colo. 2012) (half-sister has standing); In re D.T., 292 P.3d 1120, 1121 (Col.
App. 2012) (mother's friend did not gain standing because she "served more of a
grandmotherly role, rather than a parental role" and the mother never ceded her parental
rights).
32. N.M. S. Bill 185, 2001 N.M. 167.
33. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-10B-3(A) and (C) (LexisNexis 2015), applied in Stanley J. v.
Cliff L., 319 P.3d 662 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013).
34. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.43(1) (West Supp. 2006), applied in In re Marriage of
Vanderheiden, 838 N.W.2d 865 (Wis. Ct. App. 2013) (visitation for former stepfather).
35. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.375.5 (West 2009). This statute was recognized as possibly
applicable to a former same-sex partner of a child's biological mother whose new husband
sought stepparent adoption. In re Adoption of C.T.P., 452 S.W.3d 705, 708-10 (Mo. Ct. App.
2014).
36. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/601(b)(2) (West 2009) (upon a single
parent's death, "a person other than a parent" can seek child custody).
37. In re Bonfield, 780 N.E.2d 241, 247 (Ohio 2002).
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for temporary shared legal custody, as when the agreement is revocable
by the parent." In Arkansas, the "in loco parentis" doctrine operates,39 while in West Virginia, there is a "psychological parent doctrine."4 0
General third party childcare laws in some states are very similar to
the de facto parent laws in other states. Thus, while South Dakota
recognizes third party childcare standing for one who, inter alia, "has
closely bonded as a parental figure";4 ' Delaware recognizes de facto
parent status for one who, inter alia, "acted in a parental role" long
enough "to have established a bonded and dependent relationship with
the child that is parental in nature."4 2
B.

Special Laws
In addition to the general laws, there are special childcare laws4 3
that are applicable to certain designated third parties, including
stepparents or just to stepparents (both present and former).44 Such
specific laws may be accompanied by general third party childcare laws
that serve stepparents and other nonparents (like grandparents).

38. In re Mullen, 953 N.E.2d 302, 305, 306 (Ohio 2011). Custody in the nonparent is
only allowed under an agreement when the juvenile court deems the nonparent suitable
and the shared custody is in the best interests of the child. In re Bonfield, 780 N.E.2d at
249; see also In re LaPiana, Nos. 93691 and 93692, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 3071, at *24-25
(Aug. 5, 2010) (former lesbian partner secures visitation with two children born of assisted
reproduction where there was a written agreement to jointly raise the first child and other
evidence of intent to share custody of both children); In re L.J.R., No. 140037, 2015 Ohio
App. LEXIS 1150, at *31-32 (Mar. 26, 2015) (agreement between birth mother and her
former boyfriend who was not the biological father).
39. See, e.g., Bethany v. Jones, 378 S.W.3d 731 (Ark. 2011) (visitation awarded to
biological mother's former same-sex partner).
40. See, e.g., In re KH., 773 S.E.2d 20, 36 (W. Va. 2015) (visitation for grandmother
whose guardianship ended).
41. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-5-29.
42. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c)(3) (2009).
43. Besides special childcare laws, there can also be other special stepparent laws. See,
e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-7-8 (1999) ("A stepparent shall maintain his spouse's
children born prior to their marriage and is responsible as a parent for their support and
education suitable to his circumstances, but such responsibility shall not absolve the
natural or adoptive parents of the children from any obligation of support.").
44. Many people urge the state legislators to write the laws on present and former
stepparent childcare. See, e.g., Cynthia Grant Bowman, The Legal Relationship Between
Cohabitantsand Their Partners'Children, 13 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 127, 151 (2012) ("Like
Professor Bartlett, I do not think we can simply rely on judges to make extralegal decisions
to rescue children in deserving cases, nor do I think that would be good for the legitimacy
of our system of family law. Instead, any new standards should be established by statute,
to prevent, insofar as possible, inconsistent and unpredictable judicial decisions in this
area.").
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In a Tennessee divorce, "a stepparent to a minor child born to the
other party ... may be granted reasonable visitation rights . .. upon a
finding that such visitation rights would be in the best interests of the
minor child and that such stepparent is actually providing or contributing towards the support of such child."4 5 In California, "reasonable
visitation to a stepparent" is permitted if it is "in the best interest of the
minor child."4 6 In Wisconsin, a stepparent (as well as a grandparent
and others) can petition for "reasonable visitation rights" if a court
determines visitation is in the child's best interests and if there is a
preexisting "relationship similar to a parent-child relationship with the
child."4 7 In Oregon, during a dissolution proceeding, a stepparent can
obtain custody or visitation by proving "a child-parent relationship
exists," the presumption that the parent acts in the child's best interest
has been "rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence," and the child's
"best interest" will be served.4 8 If a stepparent only proves "an ongoing
personal relationship" with the child, then the parental presumption
must be rebutted by "clear and convincing evidence."49 In Utah, a
former stepparento can pursue child custody or visitation in a divorce
or "other proceeding"" through showing "by clear and convincing
evidence" that, inter alia, the stepparent "intentionally assumed the role
and obligations of a parent"; formed "an emotional bond and created a
parent-child type relationship"; contributed to the "child's well being";
and showed the parent is "absent" or has "abused or neglected the
child." 5 2 In Virginia, a former stepparent with a "legitimate interest"" can secure custody of or visitation with a child upon "showing by

45. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-303(a) (2014) (representing a seemingly questionable facial
validity under Troxel without requiring any showings on, for example, parental acts or
child detriment).
46. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3101(a) (West 2004).
47. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 767.43(1). There are other special guidelines for grandparents
who petition for visitation. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.43(3) (West Supp. 2006)
(requiring no earlier adoption of the child and the child must be a nonmarital child whose
parents never married).
48. OR. REV. STAT. § 109.119(3)(a) (2005). "Child-parent relationship" means a
relationship, within the past six months, that "fulfilled the child's psychological needs for
a parent as well as the child's physical needs." OR. REV. STAT. § 109.119(10)(a) (2005).
49. OR. REV. STAT. § 109.119(3)(b) (2005). An "ongoing personal relationship" is "a
relationship with substantial continuity for at least one year, through interaction,
companionship, interplay and mutuality." OR. REV. STAT. § 109.119(10)(e) (2005).
50. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5a-102(2)(e) (LexisNexis 2008).
51. UTAH CODE ANN. § 103(4) (LexisNexis 2008).
52. UTAH CODE ANN. § 103(2) (LexisNexis 2008).
53. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.1 (2008).
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clear and convincing evidence that the best interest of the child would
be served thereby.""
At times, special stepparent childcare laws apply only upon an existing
parent's death or disability. In Delaware, "upon the death or disability
of the custodial or primary placement parent," a stepparent who resided
with the deceased or disabled parent can request custody even if "there
is a surviving natural parent."" If a parent dies in Arizona, a former
stepparent can obtain custody of a child if they stood "in loco parentis,"5 6 it would be "significantly detrimental" for the child to be placed

in a second parent's custody,5 and there is "clear and convincing
evidence that awarding custody" to the second parent is not in the child's
"best interests."" If a single parent dies in Utah," a former stepparent 0 can seek custody or visitation with a former stepchild by showing,
inter alia, intentional assumption of "the role and obligations of a
parent," "an emotional bond" and "a parent-child type relationship," an
emotional or financial contribution to the child's well being, and the
child's best interests.
IV.

CURRENT AND PROPOSED THIRD PARTY STEPPARENT CHILDCARE
IN ILLINOIS: WHAT IS MISSING?

Additional state law options on third party stepparent childcare can
also be illustrated by a review of a few current and proposed Illinois

54. VA. CODE ANN. § 124.2(B) (2008); see, e.g., Brown v. Burch, 519 S.E.2d 403,412 (Va.
Ct. App. 1999) (noting that, over the mother's objection, "clear and convincing evidence of
special and unique circumstances" justifies a joint custody order favoring the father and
the former stepfather, with the latter "retaining physical custody of the boy"). Special
stepparent childcare laws, of course, may be coupled with special stepparent adoption laws.
See, e.g., LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1252(A) (2014) (no need for even limited homestudies
in some stepparent adoptions); MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-4-302(1)(a) (2005) (stepparent has
lived with child and a parent, who has legal and physical custody of the child, for the past
sixty days).
55. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 733 (2015).
56. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-415(A)(1) (2000). This status is achieved by being
"treated as a parent by the child" and forming "a meaningful parental relationship with the
child for a substantial period of time." ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 415(G)(1) (2000).
57. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 415(A)(2) (2000).
58. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 415(B) (2000). If not custody, a stepparent could be
awarded "reasonable visitation" on a lesser showing. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 415(C) (2000)
("in loco parentis" and "best interests").
59. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5a-103(2)(g)(i) (a parent's death would need to have the
parent deemed "absent").
60. UTAH CODE ANN. § 102(2)(d), (e) (LexisNexis 2008) (former stepparent and stepgrandparent).
61. UTAH CODE ANN. § 103(2)(a)-(b), (c), (e) (LexisNexis 2008).
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statutes. The Illinois examples demonstrate how stepparents who assist
in significant ways are unfairly given fewer childcare opportunities than
other nonparents, like grandparents, who have much less-if any--comparable histories of significant childcare.
Such distinctions often
differentiate between biologically related and biologically unrelated
nonparents in ways that disserve children's best interests.
In Illinois, the "liberty interest[s]" of parents are reflected in the
"superior rights doctrine," which holds that parents have superior rights
regarding the care of their children.6 2 This doctrine is incorporated
into Illinois statutes through court-ordered third party childcare by a
nonparent, including a stepparent, over parental objection.
One current Illinois statute authorizes childcare by way of "reasonable
visitation," if the "parent is deceased or is disabled and is unable to care
for the child" and the stepparent has continuously lived for at least five
years with the parent and child, who is at least twelve years old.63
This statute also requires the child's preference and the promotion of
"the best interests and welfare of the child."'
Third party stepparent childcare, by way of "child custody," is also
statutorily authorized in Illinois for a "stepparent" if the child is at least
twelve years old; the custodial parent and stepparent were married for
at least five years while the child resided with them; "the custodial
parent is deceased or is disabled and cannot perform" parental "duties";
"the stepparent provided for the care, control, and welfare to the child
prior to the initiation of custody proceedings"; the "child wishes to live
with the stepparent"; and, it is in the child's "best interests and welfare
...
to live with the stepparent."" The same statute seemingly allows
child custody pursuit by a stepparent who qualifies as a "person other
than a parent . .. only if [the child] is not in the physical custody of one
of [the] parents."6 6

62. See, e.g., In re Scarlett Z.-D., 28 N.E.3d 776, 795 (111. 2015). Before Troxel, parental
rights to childrear in Illinois, when challenged by nonparents, seemingly were less
superior. See, e.g., Cebrzynski v. Cebrzynski, 379 N.E.2d 713, 714 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (as
both stepmother and natural mother were fit parents after father's death, joint and mutual
custody in both mothers, and actual physical custody to stepmother alone and visitation
rights for natural mother).
63. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/607(b)(1.5)(C) (West 2009). Where the stepparent
was married to a parent who had custody and died, the stepparent may be able to obtain
guardianship of the child's person and estate over the other parent's objection. 755 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/11-5(a) (West 2007) (rebuttable presumption of childcare by surviving
parent), applied in In re A.W., 994 N.E.2d 726 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (sufficient allegations on
presumption's rebuttal so that a hearing was required).
64. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/607 (b)(1.5) (West 2009).
65. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/601(b)(3) (West 2009).
66. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/601(b)(2) (West 2009).
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When a custodial parent dies, another Illinois statute facilitates more
opportunity for grandparent custody than for stepparent custody, at
least for the parents of the child's deceased parent. The previously noted
requirements for stepparent custody do not apply to grandparents.
Grandparents can seek custody of their grandchildren as long as the
"surviving parent" was in state or federal custody or "had been absent
from the marital abode for more than one month without the deceased
spouse knowing his or her whereabouts."67 So, only stepparents are
ineligible for custody of children under twelve and of children for whom
they provided childcare for less than five years, regardless of the
children's best interests. Grandchildren sometimes can be placed in
grandparent custody to the clear detriment of the child and stepparent.
Biology trumps best interests.
Beyond these statutes, Illinois common law precedent supporting third
party stepparent childcare is very limited." One case recognizes a
former stepparent's contractual right to childrear, over parental
objection, via the equitable estoppel doctrine." The right can be
exercised where there is harm to the child; an earlier agreement by the
parent to allow a former stepparent an opportunity for child visitation;
reasonable reliance by the former stepparent on the agreement; and a
detrimental "change" to the former stepparent's position as a result of
the agreement." Another case recognizes that a widowed stepparent
can seek a guardianship of a stepchild, the deceased spouse's natural
child, over the other natural parent's objection, if the stepparent
demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the living parent

67. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/601(b)(4)(A) (West 2009).
68. There seems little room for further common law development given the Illinois
Supreme Court's deference to the General Assembly (where there can be a full "policy
debate") on issues of de facto parentage. In re Scarlett Z.-D., 28 N.E.3d at 795.
69. In re Marriage of Engelkens, 821 N.E.2d 799 (111. App. Ct. 2004).
70. Id. at 806. Equitable estoppel is more readily available when the agreement
becomes part of a court order, as in In re Marriage of Schlam, 648 N.E.2d 345, 348 (Ill.
Comparably, where there was an earlier consent decree allowing
App. Ct. 1995).
grandparent visits, continued visits over parental objection can be ordered, though
"changed circumstances" can end all visits. See, e.g., In re M.M.D., 820 N.E.2d 392, 395,
401 (Ill. 2004) (consolidated cases involving maternal grandparents seeking guardianship
of deceased daughter's child with unwed biological father wherein parties earlier agreed
to consent order awarding permanent custody to father and recognizing for the
grandparents "specific and detailed visitation rights, telephone access to the child,
information about the child's education and medical care, and authorization to speak with
child's teachers, school personnel, counselors and physicians").
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is unwilling or unable "to make and carry out day-to-day childcare
decisions concerning the minor."n
New Illinois statutes should expand opportunities for stepparent
childcare. Until then, childcare decisions generally will be left to
"natural or adoptive parents," regardless of their earlier accessions to
stepparent childcare and regardless of the best interests of their
children."
Recognizing the need for reforms for parental and third party
childcare interests, the Illinois General Assembly created a study
committee, resulting in the recently proposed Illinois Parentage Acts 7 4
and proposed amendments to the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of
Marriage Acts (MDM Act).7 ' The Parentage Acts and MDM Act

71. In re A.W., 994 N.E.2d at 728 (employing 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/11-5(b)
(West 2007)). For an argument that Illinois common law should recognize childcare
interests in nonbiological and nonadoptive child caretakers whose same sex couple
relationships are dissolving, see Desiree Sierens, Protectingthe Parent-ChildRelationship:
The Need for Illinois Courts to Extend Standing to Non-biological Parents in Regard to
Visitation Proceedings, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 483 (2005).
72. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 45/2 (LexisNexis 2015) (Illinois Parentage Act of 1984).
While, the statute seemingly promotes certainty, it comes at the expense of children's and
adults lived experiences and legitimate expectations, creating a new class of illegitimate
children. Carlos A. Ball, Rendering Children Illegitimate in Former PartnerParenting
Cases: Hiding Behind the Fagade of Certainty, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 623
(2012).
73. On the cost of recognizing such parental authority, see, e.g., T.M.H. v. D.M.T., 79
So. 3d 787 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011), which is a case involving possible future childrearing
by a woman who provided her ova to her lesbian partner so both women could childrear;
a concurring opinion declared:
I write . .. to highlight the unfortunate absence of an important consideration that
should inform our decision in cases such as this. Yes, I know, as did the able trial
judge, that the best interests of the child is ordinarily not the test to be applied
.... I think that we need to find a way to redirect our focus in cases of this kind
so that best interests becomes part of the decisional matrix. Surely we have to
make room for that factor in the crucible. Exploring the parental rights of one
litigant or the other should not be the end of our deliberations. In the final
analysis, we still ought to come to grips with what is best for the child. Here,
having two parents is better than one.
79 So. 3d at 804-05 (Monaco, J., concurring).
74. The Illinois Family Law Study Committee's work led to Ill. H. Bill 6191,97th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (2012), which includes a Proposed Illinois Parentage Act of 2012. One
2013 Proposed Illinois Parentage Act appears in Ill. H. Bill 1243, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (2013). One 2015 Proposed Illinois Parentage Act appears in Ill. H. Bill 1531, 99th
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (2015).
75. The Illinois Family Law Study Committee's work led to Ill. H. Bill 6192, 97th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (2012), which included proposed changes to a variety of Illinois statutes
governing family matters, including the Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, the
Alienation of Affections Act, and the Domestic Violence Act. The main proposed changes
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proposals must be read together because they sometimes cover comparable childcare interests.
For example, the marital presumptions
establishing nonbiological and nonadoptive parentage are found in the
varying proposed 2012 amendments to the Parentage Act," while the
2012 proposed amendments to the MDM Act recognize nonbiological and
nonadoptive parentage for certain unwed child caretakers.7 7 Unfortunately, the varying proposals, since the study ended, insufficiently
address the inadequacies of current Illinois third party stepparent
childcare. The continuing failures to recognize the interests of stepparent and stepchildren in continuing their strong and beneficial familial
relationships in Illinois reflect similar failures across the country.
One set of proposed amendments to the Illinois MDM Act of 2012
would allow many former stepparents 78 to be eligible for "an allocation
of parenting time" if the relationships between the parents and
stepparents ended.7 ' The proposed MDM Act of 2012, however,

are described in Adam W. Lasker, Is a Family - Law Overhaul on the Way?, 100 ILL. B.J.
458 (2012). One of set of 2013 proposed changes to the MDM Act appear in Ill. S. Bill 10,
98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (2013). One set of 2015 proposed changes to the MDM Act
appear in Ill. S. Bill 57, 99th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (2015). The 2015 proposed changes
to the MDM Act offered by the sponsor (Representative Kelly Burke) of earlier proposals
founded on the committee's study focuses primarily on child guidelines and says nothing
about parentage or third party childcare. Ill. H. Bill 3982, 99th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(2015).
76. See, e.g., Ill. H. Bill 6191 § 204(a)(1) (man presumed a parent of a child if "he and
the mother . .. are married to each other or are in a state-recognized civil union and the
child is born ...
during the marriage or civil union, except as provided by the Gestational
Surrogacy Act or Article 7 of this Act" [Child of Assisted Reproduction]).
77. See, e.g., Ill. H. Bill 6192 ("Equitable parent" includes "a person who, though not
a legal parent of a child . .. lived with the child for at least 2 years" while believing to be
"the child's biological parent").
78. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-221(2005) (upon death of"a parent," a nonparent who
had established a child-parent relationship with the child can seek "a parenting plan
hearing"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-211(6) (2005); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-123(1)(c)
(West 2009) (nonparent can seek "allocation of parental responsibilities" if they have "had
the physical care of a child" for more than six months, as long as action is commenced
"within six months of termination of such physical care").
79. Ill. H. Bill 6192 (codified at 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/601.2(b)(3) (West 2009),
with parenting time defined in 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/600 (West 2009). Allocations
of parental time, however, involve less significant childcare opportunities than allocations
of parental responsibilities. See Ill. H. Bill 6192 (codified at 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
§ 5/600) (parental responsibilities include both "parenting time" and "significant decisionmaking responsibilities with respect to a child").
As compared to parenting "responsibilities" or "time" in Ohio, where noncustodial family
members, including grandparents and other relatives, may seek "reasonable companionship
or visitation rights" when a related custodial parent dies, OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.11
(LexisNexis 2015), as long as Troxel limits are met. See Oliver v. Feldner, 776 N.E.2d 499,
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recognizes limited standing for current and former stepparents, as
equitable parents who provided childcare, to seek an "allocation of
parental responsibilities."so Such standing depends upon the death or
disability of a legal parent."' The 2012 proposal recognizes both a legal
parent, defined as "a biological or adoptive parent,"" and an "equitable
parent," defined as one who is not a legal parent, but who is obligated
by court order to pay child support; is a stepparent; lived with the child
for at least two years and reasonably believed they were "the child's
biological parent"; or "lived with the child since the child's birth or for
at least 2 years, and held himself out as the child's parent . .. under an
agreement with the child's legal parent" or legal parents.8
The same 2012 proposed changes to the MDM Act offered no
amendments to "reasonable visitation" opportunities for stepparents or
grandparents, and as a result, the twelve-year-old child and five year
residence norms went unaddressed.
One set of 2015 proposed changes to the MDM Act recognizes
"visitation"8 opportunities for "step-parents"" and other nonparents. Such opportunities can only be pursued, however, "if there has
been an unreasonable denial of visitation by a parent and the denial has
caused the child undue mental, physical, or emotional harm,"" with the
burden on the petitioner to show such unreasonableness and harm."
Further, such opportunities may only be pursued by nonparents,

509 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) (Troxel limits not met); see also In re K.P.R., 966 N.E.2d 952, 95758 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011) (Troxel limits may have been met where a "relative" of the
deceased mother was a stepfather who had visitation rights, despite the custodial biological
father's objection, because he had waived nonjurisdictional arguments earlier regarding the
visits).
80. Ill. H. Bill 6192.
81. Id. (codified at 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/601.2(b)(2) (West 2009)).
82. Id. (codified at 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/600).
83. Id.
84. Id. (codified at 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/600); id. (codified at 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. § 5/601.2 (West 2009)).
85. S. Bill 57 (codified at 750 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/602.9(a)(4) (West 2009) (defined
as "in-person time spent" with a child, including "electronic communication," defined in 750
ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/602.9(a)(1) (West 2009)).
86. 750 ILL. COMP STAT. ANN. § 5/602.9(a)(3) (West 2009) (defined as "a person married
to a child's parent, including a person married to the child's parent immediately prior to
the parent's death").
87. Id. § 5/602.9(a)(4) (permitting "visitation" between a child and the child's
grandparent, greatgrandparent, sibling, and any other person a deployed military parent
designates "to exercise reasonable substitute visitation . . . in the best interests of the
child," according to § 5/602.7(e) (West 2009)).
88. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/602.9(b)(3) (West 2009).
89. 750 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/602.9(b)(4) (West 2009).
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including stepparents, under certain conditions, including when the
child's parent is deceased or missing;9 0 a parent is incompetent; 9' a
parent is incarcerated; 92 the parents are separated or divorced and at
least one parent does not object to nonparent visitation;" or the
parents are unwed and not living together where their parentage has
been legally established." Thus, strong and beneficial stepparentstepchild familial relationships are subject to parental veto as long as
there is no "undue" harm to the children. This is so even where the
children are themselves well-adjusted and capable of weathering storms
due to the guidance of their stepparents and even where longstanding
relationships were invited and supported by the parents who now act
unreasonably in denying visitation and ending loving relationships they
long encouraged. Superior parental rights here run amok.
Another set of 2015 proposed amendments to the Illinois MDM Act
differentiates between third party childcare opportunities for grandparents and stepparents." While the amendments continue the very
limited recognition of third party stepparent childcare,96 they significantly expand "reasonable visitation rights" involving third party
grandparent childcare."
In particular, grandparent visitation is
sanctioned for a child in a "dual-parent household if there is an
unreasonable denial of visitation by a parent and the grandparent has
maintained a significant beneficial relationship with the child" for at
least twelve months "immediately preceding the severance of that
relationship by the parent."98 Here again, biology trumps the children's
best interests because only the grandparents are usually biologically
tied.
V.

NEW STATE

LAWS

ON THIRD PARTY STEPPARENT CHILDCARE

How might American state stepparent childcare laws be improved?
One method involves extending opportunities for continuing stepparent-

90. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/602.9(c)(1)(A) (West 2009).
91. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/602.9(c)(1)(B) (West 2009).
92. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/602.9(c)(1)(C) (West 2009).
93. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/602.9(c)(1)(D) (West 2009).
94. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/602.9(c)(1)(E) (West 2009).
95. Ill. H. Bill 1414, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (2015).
96. Ill. H. Bill 1414, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/607(b)(1.5).
97. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/607(a-5)(1.5) (West 2009).
98. Id. A presumption of "a significant beneficial relationship" arises, inter alia, when
the child resided continuously with the grandparent for at least half a year within the past
year ("with or without the current custodian present"; when the grandparent was the
"primary caretaker" for at least 6 months; or when the grandparent had "frequent or
regular contact or visitation with the child throughout the 12-month period").
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stepchild relationships postdissolution to serve the best interests of the
children." Court orders on postdissolution stepparent third party
childcare, of course, must respect each adoptive or biological parent's
superior rights. Therefore, such an order should require more than "a
thinned-out conception" of a former stepparent as a child caretaker."
Such an order need not always be accompanied by a finding of detriment
to the child if stepparent childcare is ended, at least where each adoptive
or biological parent had earlier, strongly supported a parental-like or
coparent role for the stepparent. Earlier support can constitute ceding
of, or a form of consent to, a later diminishment of superior parental
rights.101

99. Grandparent childcare opportunities are also significantly limited in Illinois,
though they need not be if Troxel is read not to require a showing of harm. 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. § 5/607(a-5)(3) (West 2009) (grandparent visitation order only where
grandparent shows parent's objections "are harmful to the child's mental, physical, or
emotional health"), applied in Flynn v. Henkel, 880 N.E.2d 166, 168 (Ill. 2007) and In re
Anaya R., 977 N.E.2d 836 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). Grandparent childcare differs from
stepparent childcare in that only the former grants certain grandparents (for example,
parents of custodial parent of grandchild) the ability to remain in the child's family while
the later often permits childcaretakers acting like, and recognized in the community and
by the children, as parents, or at least quasi-parents, to remain in the child's family. For
Illinois grandparent childcare opportunities, see, e.g., Jeffery A. Parness, Expanded
Stepparent and GrandparentThird-PartyChildcare in Illinois, 40 S. ILL. L.J. 1 (2015).
100. Robin Fretwell Wilson, Trusting Mothers: A Critique of the American Law
Institute's Treatment of De Facto Parents, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1103, 1109 (2010) (warning
against "a thinned-out conception of parenthood" that is "primarily a function of coresidence" and that "would give former live-in partners access to a child" even when
opposed by the legal parent, who is "nearly always a child's mother"), employed in In re
B.M.H., 315 P.3d at 486 (Madsen, C.J., concurring).
101. Thus, a parent's current wishes need to be accorded less "special weight" when
preceded by that parent's earlier longstanding wishes for strong and loving stepparent-stepchild relations, especially where the parent's support for such relations continued
for at least some time after the relationship between one parent and the stepparent soured.
See, e.g., Middleton v. Johnson, 633 S.E.2d 162, 169 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006) (a single parent
"cannot maintain an absolute zone of privacy [around his or her child] if he or she
voluntarily invites a third party to function as a parent to the child"). See generally Jeffrey
A. Parness, Constitutional Constraintson Second ParentLaws, 40 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 811
(2014) (demonstrating how such adoptive or biological parent support similarly allows, for
example, a former stepparent to be designated a second parent). Concededly, where there
are two parents, the parent not personally involved with the stepparent (as by marriage)
will have their wishes adjudged a bit differently than the involved parent. Concededly,
there may be two parents and two stepparents simultaneously vying for childcare
opportunities for a single child. Any such stepparent-childcare disputes are not that
different from disputes in third party settings between two parents and two sets of
grandparents except, however, it is more likely that stepparents acted in parental-like roles
than grandparents.
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Another method regarding whether a former stepparent generally has
childcare opportunities in a former stepchild upon dissolution involves
childcare opportunities when a single parent, either then married or
once married to a stepparent, dies.102 Here, there would be no parent
with superior parental rightS.10 3 Additionally, a child's best interests
often would be well served by continuing or renewing stepparent
childcare. Special third party stepparent childcare standing would be
made contingent upon a single parent's death where the stepparent had
a "substantial relationship" with the stepchildo' and where the child's
best interests would be served.o' In Illinois, upon a single parent's
death, "a person other than a parent" can seek custody of a child who "is
not in the physical custody of one of his parents."'0 6 Today, there is
no special statute (or presumption) favoring a present or former stepparent,10 7 even though a stepparent is far more likely to have developed a

102. See In re A.P.P., 251 P.3d 127 (Mont. 2011).
103. Id. at 129 (parental interest recognized in stepfather after child's mother died
where substantial evidence established that the father "engaged in conduct contrary to the
child-parent relationship").
104. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 77-78 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment).
105. Comparably, at times when a parent places a child up for adoption with a certain
couple, that parent can later seek renewed custody if the adoption fails. Here, the
termination of parental rights is contingent. See, e.g., A.D.R. v. J.L.H., 994 So. 2d 177, 183
(Miss. 2008). As well, when a designated adopting person or couple (like the grandparents)
die, a parent may not be able to fully resurrect her superior rights at times; however, the
parent might be given an opportunity to reclaim custody, as upon a showing by clear and
convincing evidence that custody is in the child's best interests. See, e.g., D.M. v. D.R., 62
So. 3d 920, 927 (Miss. 2011).
106. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/601(b)(2).
107. See, e.g., 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/11-3(a) (West 2007); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. §§ 5/11-5(a), (a-1), (b) (West 2007) (guardianship qualifications when legal parents are
not available include a "best interest" test and no preference for a former stepparent, or
"de facto" parent, with perhaps some preference for one who is designated in writing by a
parent or parents as a guardian should the parent or parents die). Any special statute
need not necessarily grant standing to a former stepparent to seek a childcare order, and
it may simply grant a right to be heard, with an opportunity to seek standing later in order
to pursue renewed custody or visitation. But see 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 4 05/1-5(2)(a)
(West 2007) (any "relative caregiver" "has the right to be heard" in a child neglect and
shelter proceeding, though not the right to be a party. 705 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. § 405/15(1) (West 2007)). For a review of American state laws on parental testamentary appointments of child guardians, see Alyssa A. DiRusso & S. Kristen Peters, ParentalTestamentary Appointments Of Guardians For Children, 25 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 369 (2012)
(urging statutory reforms so that parental wishes will more likely to be followed).
Not only is there no special statute on former stepparents, but there are also times when
former stepparents seem excluded from possible consideration for undertaking the care of
a former stepchild. See, e.g., 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 505/7(b) (West 2008) (Department
of Children and Family Services may consider a child's placement with a relative, which
includes "the child's step-father, step-mother, or adult step-brother or step-sister," but not
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parental-like relationship with the child than any other third party
(who, unfortunately, may be significantly motivated by the awards
potentially available in wrongful death and survival actions)."'8
There is also a statute in Illinois mandating "visitation rights" for the
grandparents, regardless of their earlier childcare, where a single parent
dies or both parents die.o' Visitation ensues "unless it is shown that
such visitation would be detrimental to the best interests and welfare of
the minor." 1 o Other relatives, and those "having an interest in the
welfare of the child," can also seek visitation."' It makes little sense
to explicitly reference grandparents and not stepparents when the latter
are much more likely to have assumed parental-like roles.
Further, there is an Illinois statute allowing grandparents, greatgrandparents, and siblings (including stepbrothers and stepsisters) to
petition for visitation with a minor child, one year or older, if "there is
an unreasonable denial of visitation by a parent" and "the child's other
parent is deceased or has been missing for at least 3 months" or the
child was born out of wedlock to parents who are not living together." 2
Again, it makes little sense to favor grandparents and stepsiblings-who
likely never acted as parents---over stepparents, who likely acted as
parents.
If a parent placed a child up for adoption a day, a week, or a month
after a divorce, a former stepparent often would not receive any notice
of the potential adoption in Illinois. Yet, notice is required to "any
person who is openly living with the child or the child's mother at the

a former step-father or step-mother).
108. Fortunately, at times third party visitation issues are resolved by reference to,
inter alia, "the motivation of the adults in either prohibiting or pursuing visitation."
Waddle v. Waddle, 447 S.W.3d 653, 656 (Ky. Ct. App. 2014).
109. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/11-7.1 (West 2007) (unless the child has been
adopted; yet, grandparent visitation may be ordered where adoption is by "a close
relative").
110. Id. (unless the child has been adopted; yet nonparent visitation may be ordered
where adoption was by "a close relative").
111. Id. (statute also recognizes "reasonable visitation rights may be granted to any
other relative of the minor or other person having an interest in the welfare of the child").
New grandparent visits could also arise upon the death of a parent when the grandparents
had earlier secured visits during a marriage dissolution proceeding and later seek to
modify the divorce court order. See, e.g., Moreno v. Perez, 363 S.W.3d 725, 744 (Tex. App.
2011). As well, grandparents, upon the death of parents, can easily acquire custody of their
grandchildren via guardianship appointments when the deceased parents provided for such
custody in written instruments. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-5-202.5 (LexisNexis 1993)
(no notice required to anyone before appointment becomes effective), applied in In re
A.T.I.G., 293 P.3d 276 (Utah 2012).
112. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/607(a-3) (West 2009); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
§§ (a-5)(1)(A-5), (E) (West 2009).
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time the proceeding is initiated and who is holding himself out to be the
child's father.""'s So, if, postdissolution, a parent had a new, cohabitating intimate partner, that partner might have standing but not the
fit and loving former stepparent. Here, too, as in death, a special statute
should specially protect certain long-established and loving relationships
between stepparents and their stepchildren.
A stepparent's failure to formally adopt a single parent spouse's child,
for whatever reason, causes both the stepparent and the child to lose any
chance to pursue a continuing familial relationship upon a single
parent's death or upon placement for adoption, regardless of the child's
best interest. Yet, in many parental rights termination settings, bad
acting parents get second chances, as where parent-child reunification
obligations are imposed on the state or where there is no termination of
parental rights unless a child's best interest is served." As a result,
many marginal parents maintain their superior rights notwithstanding
their earlier parenting failures and their children's contrary interests.
Stepparents and their stepchildren can see their loving relationships
ended if former stepparents and their ex-spouses no longer get along for
whatever reason.
Another method for expanding third party stepparent childcare
involves General Assembly adoption of the Illinois Uniform Premarital
Agreement Act (Uniform Act)."' The Uniform Act recognizes the need
for judicial deference to premarital and midmarriage pacts between
parents and stepparents on future stepparent childcare if parental death

113. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 50/7(C)(e) (West 2009) (notice). Where there is, for
example, a baptism record, see also 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 7(f) (West 2009) (notice
required to one "identified as the child's father by the mother in a written, sworn
statement"). For the need for a former stepfather's consent to any later adoption by
another, consider 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 50/8(b)(vi) (West 2009) (consent to adoption
of child over six months old required by the "father" who "openly lived with the child" and
"openly held himself out to be the father of the child") and 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
§ 50/8(a)(2) (West 2009) (consent not required, however, when the father is neither "the
biological or adoptive father of the child"). Even if a former stepfather's consent is deemed
required under this provision, the power to veto is undercut because there is no explicit
duty to give a former stepfather any notice. See also 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
§ 50/14.5(a) (West 2009) (former parent, where parental rights were terminated due to
unfitness, can petition to adopt former child).
114. See, e.g., In re Destiny R., 39 A.3d 727 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012); In re J.G., No. 2-130645, 2013 Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2550, at *1, *2 (Nov. 12, 2013) (guardianship of minor
born with cocaine in her system immediately after birth, with mother then deemed "unfit
or unable" to childcare; five years later, after significant attempts to reunite mother and
child, mother's parental rights are terminated); see also 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
§ 50/14.5(a) (former parent, whose parental rights were terminated due to unfitness, can
petition to adopt former child).
115. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 10/1 to 10/11 (West 2009).
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or disability, or a marriage dissolution, ensue.11 6 The Uniform Act,
enacted in July 2012 by the National Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, expressly recognizes pacts on "custodial responsibility" between
parents and either future or current stepparents, with the pacts said to
serve as "guidance" for courts that maintain ultimate decisionmaking
regarding contested childcare.1"
VI.

CONCLUSION

Stepparents without any biological or formal adoptive ties who have
developed "familial bonds" or parental-like relationships with their
stepchildren should have greater statutory third party childcare
standing."' As occurs in other family settings, like premarital agreements and open adoption pacts,"'9 certain family related agreements
on stepparent childcare also deserve greater recognition. 20 Expanded

116.

750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.

§ 10/2

(West 2009).

117. The Act's provision on "custodial responsibility" is reviewed in Jeffrey A. Parness,
ParentagePrenups and Midnups, 31 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 343 (2015).
118. The desirability of greater certainty and comprehensive coverage, as well as
separation of powers concerns, suggest guidelines should normally originate in statutes.
See, e.g., Kitchen v. Kitchen, 953 N.E.2d 646, 649 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (rejecting visitation
standing in maternal aunt and uncle over father's objection where the mother had died;
court recognized grandparent visitation standing had come by statute, former stepparent
visitation standing had come by precedent, and former foster parent visitation standing
had been rejected by precedent).
119. One example of private ordering is 23 PA. STAT. & CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2733(a)
(2014) ("A prospective adoptive parent of a child may enter into an agreement with a birth
relative of the child to permit continuing contact or communication between the child and
the birth relative or between the adoptive parent and the birth relative."). Notwithstanding legitimate concerns, private ordering seems to stay here, as demonstrated by the everincreasing childcare opportunities for nonbiological and nonadoptive parents and for
nonparent child caretakers that arise from the parents (biological or adoptive) ceding
some-but not all-of their superior rights. See, e.g., Rowell v. Smith No. 12AP-802, 2013
Ohio App. LEXIS 2131, at *14 (May 30,2013) (agreement purposefully relinquishing "some
portion of the parent's right to exclusive custody"); see generally Parness, supra note 101,
at 840-42. Vulnerable parties (that is, children) can be well-protected by close judicial
scrutiny of proposed or actual childcare.
120. In the absence of an express Illinois statute, agreements on future childcare
opportunities between parents and nonparents (including former stepparents, grandparents, former cohabitants, and others - like aunts and uncles) where the nonparents later
seek childcare opportunities over parental objections must seemingly utilize the narrow
range of common law precedents on equitable estoppel of the parents. Precedents deem
such agreements important, if not dispositive, where there is shown detrimental reliance,
earlier judicial recognition of the agreements, childrens' best interests, and, perhaps, harm
to children. See, e.g., Engelkens, 821 N.E.2d at 804-06 (distinguishing Schlam, 648 N.E.2d
at 349-50). Here, unlike potential childcare opportunities for certain former stepparents
without agreements, childcare standing seems best developed through common law
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third party stepparent childcare should be especially recognized when a
parent facilitated loving stepparent-stepchild relations and when the
preservation of the relations furthers the child's best, or perhaps
compelling, interests, notwithstanding current parental objections.121
To date, many American state lawmakers have failed to consider
important stepparent childcare issues.
New American state statutes are needed to better preserve the strong
bonds between children and the stepparents who have cared for and
loved them. State legislators should recognize a broader array of
"established familial or family-like bonds"122 and expressly authorize
judicial action on behalf of former stepparents and stepchildren because
courts will often "decline to go where the legislature has not led."1 2
Should the General Assembly fail to act, incremental common law
developments should be considered to preserve "substantial"'2 4 stepparent-stepchild relationships while respecting superior parental rights.1 25
Judicial precedents are especially needed where single parents earlier
consciously and significantly encouraged loving parent-like relationships
between their children and stepparents.

precedents.
121. See, e.g., Sides v. Ikner, 730 S.E.2d 844, 851 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (courts need to
look at legal parents' conduct and intentions, not just nonparent acts, to insure protection
of rights emanating from "paramount parental status").
122. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 88 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
123. In re A.W., 796 N.E.2d 729, 736 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
124. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 76-77 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment).
125. See, e.g., In re Custody of A.F.J., 314 P.3d 373 (Wash. 2013) (where legislature has
taken no action in response to common law de facto parent developments, legislative
approval of continuing common law rulings is inferred).

